It depends on what you mean by “free will.” These days, the topic is so convoluted that it’s hard to know not just what to believe, but what anybody is talking about.

The kind of free will most people mean when they talk about it involves the ability to do otherwise at any moment. (I am free to get up from my chair, or I am free to stay seated). This view of free will is sometimes called the “traditional” view (in the academic world it is currently referred to as “leeway incompatibilism”). Do we have this kind of free will? Sadly (for many), I honestly don’t think so. Sure, you can get up from your chair if you wish–no one is forcing you–but this lack of outward restraint is traditionally referred to as “freedom of action,” not free will. Freedom of action simply means you are externally free to act–no one is forcing or hindering you. But whether you could have done otherwise than what you actually do–this requires a closer look.

One reason I say the traditional view of free will likely doesn’t exist is simply because it might not even make sense. Every event, it seems, is determined (caused) by something else. This seems to be the way the world works. (I know that some discoveries in quantum mechanics may cast doubt on this view, and that some philosophers have tried to use quantum mechanics to support free will, but in my view this line of thinking is far-fetched, to say the least). You might claim your will determines your action, or simply that you do; but if you could, in fact, have done otherwise, then why did you do the thing you did in the first place? Was it simply arbitrary? Random? An accident? If so, then this wasn’t really your decision at all–at least not in any meaningful sense. This is why critics of the traditional view say that without a robust sense of causation, we cannot say we have control over our actions. The traditional view of free will, then, might just be make-believe.

A different and similarly popular version of free will actually seeks to include determinism. This is known as compatibilism, as determinism and free will are seen to be “compatible” on this view. According to one classic version of compatibilism, our actions are determined by our desires and wishes. If we are able to do what we desire, then we are free. To many–including me–a view like this (though it needs much more explanation) seems to make good sense of human behavior. A problem I have is that if indeed this is the correct view of things, then in the end it might not make sense to call it “free will.” The term seems to lose its significance.

Other philosophers today think of free will in terms of the sources of our actions–whether an action is free or not is determined by considering how the action came about. Both incompatibilists and compatibilists have been attracted by this perspective. Others have still different views; the field seems to get more convoluted by the day. Interestingly, the more I studied these issues in grad school, the closer all the views seemed to get–especially since the emergence of the aforementioned “sourcehood” views. In the end, I gathered, perhaps we had better look to science to assist us. Sadly once again, however, the data there is disputed.

Regardless of which view we choose to believe (ahem), at least two things are clear from the word of God. First of all, it is clear from the Bible that we are all presented with significant moral choices to make. Second, it is clear that we are responsible for those choices. The traditional view of free will might appear to make more sense of moral responsibility than compatibilism, which might mean that compatibilists should work hard to show how determinism and moral responsibility go together; nevertheless, few things are clearer in the word of God than the fact of our moral responsibility. Whatever view we take on free will, we cannot sacrifice this crucial point. And this includes those (like me) who have a high view of God’s sovereignty, and who believe that repentance and faith are gifts bestowed upon us completely by the grace and power of God.